

Internal Security Challenges in the Northeast with special reference to current ethnic conflict in Manipur¹

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Abstract

Insurgency in Northeast India is among the most enduring internal security challenges faced by the Indian state, rooted in colonial legacies, ethno-political discontent, and cross-border ethnic solidarities. Originating with the Naga assertion of sovereignty in the early 1950s, insurgency has since proliferated among other ethnic groups, notably the Meiteis and Kukis. British administrative segregation and missionary interventions fostered fragmented identities and uneven access to education and governance, shaping divergent political trajectories among the region's ethnic communities. The Indian state has responded through a dual strategy of accommodation—via peace accords, constitutional autonomy, and targeted development—and coercion, including the enactment of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and cross-border security operations.

Insurgent groups have evolved from ideologically motivated movements into fragmented militias involved in informal governance, extortion, and narcotics trafficking, often operating across porous borders with Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Nepal. External actors, including China and Pakistan, have historically supported these groups, complicating India's efforts at stabilization. The current Meitei-Kuki conflict, triggered by a 2023 court recommendation on Meitei Scheduled Tribe status, exemplifies the region's descent into violent ethnic polarization. This conflict reflects deeper structural issues: competition for land and resources, the near collapse of administrative neutrality, and a crisis of inter-community trust.

¹ This paper is based on interpretative interviews conducted by the author with eminent Naga, Meitei, and Kuki community leaders, scholars, retired state government officials, human rights activists, and social workers during May–June 2024 in Manipur and Delhi. Views and observations from other authors and sources have been duly quoted and cited wherever used.

Naga, Meitei, and Kuki insurgencies each articulate distinct but overlapping grievances—ranging from claims of sovereignty and historical betrayal to demands for ethnic protection and territorial autonomy. The resulting fragmentation of state authority has turned civil society into a proxy for ethnic militias, with governance increasingly shaped by identity politics. Geopolitically, the region's instability undermines India's Act East policy, while Kuki transnational aspirations for Zale'n-Gam, a Greater Kukiland, add a cross-border dimension to domestic unrest.

Drawing on theoretical frameworks such as Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), the insurgencies in Northeast India are best understood not as mere law-and-order issues but as manifestations of weak state capacity, ethnic exclusion, and unresolved nation-building. Without a sustained, inclusive peacebuilding initiative that addresses historical grievances and contemporary ethnic aspirations, the region is likely to remain trapped in a cycle of episodic violence and fragile peace.

Insurgency in Northeast India represents the country's earliest and most persistent challenge to national integration, deeply rooted in ethno-political discontent and historical grievances. It began with the Naga assertion for sovereignty in 1952–53 through the formation of the Naga National Council (NNC), establishing a precedent for other ethnic movements in the region.

The rise of insurgent nationalism in the Northeast is historically linked to colonial administrative strategies. British policies in the tribal regions of Northeast India and Burma were characterized by minimal governance, indirect control through traditional chieftains, and administrative separation of tribal areas from mainstream provinces. These strategies reinforced fragmented ethnic identities while impeding the emergence of a broader political consciousness. After independence, India inherited this complex ethnic landscape and faced the difficult task of politically and culturally integrating tribal societies that had limited exposure to Indian nationalism.

In response to regional unrest, the Indian government adopted a dual approach—combining accommodation with coercion. On the conciliatory front, the state engaged various ethnic communities through peace accords and memoranda of understanding, incorporated special constitutional provisions such

as the Sixth Schedule that enabled autonomous governance, and created full-fledged states to accommodate ethnic aspirations. It also implemented targeted development programs, administrative reforms, and mechanisms for cultural recognition. Concurrently, the government pursued coercive strategies, including the enactment of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in 1958, modernization of the police apparatus, fencing of international borders, and diplomatic initiatives with Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bhutan to dismantle insurgent infrastructure and disrupt arms smuggling routes.

The persistence of insurgency is largely attributable to cross-border ethnic linkages, external support, and transnational ethnic solidarity, which often bypass the formal administrative mechanisms of the Indian state. In its early stages, insurgent groups received ideological and material assistance from China and Pakistan and later found sanctuary in Bangladesh under the Khaleda Zia government. Bhutan was briefly exploited by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), while Myanmar has remained the most consistent external base, owing to shared ethnic populations—particularly among Nagas, Kukis, and Meiteis—on both sides of the border with Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram.

Analytically, insurgency in the region can be viewed through two intersecting lenses. First, there are movements resisting Indian state authority, particularly its coercive measures such as AFSPA, and asserting claims to sovereignty or self-determination. These include the Naga and Meitei insurgencies. Second, there are insurgencies emerging from inter- and intra-ethnic tensions, competition over land and resources, and demands for political autonomy within or outside the Indian Union. The Kuki insurgency fits this second category, although in the current context, it has increasingly taken on overtly secessionist aspirations.

Whereas the Naga and Meitei groups frame their struggles as attempts to reclaim historical sovereignty and cultural distinctiveness, the Kuki movement has focused more on securing territorial control and ethnic protection. Over time, however, all major insurgencies in the Northeast have undergone significant transformation. From ideologically driven guerrilla campaigns, they have

increasingly evolved into decentralized, factionalized militias involved in informal governance, extortion, territorial dominance, and cross-border narcotics trafficking.

At its core, insurgency in Northeast India is not merely a law-and-order issue but a symptom of a deeper crisis in nation-building. It reveals the limits of state integration in a region marked by strong ethnic identities, historical autonomy, and geopolitical vulnerabilities. These insurgencies represent layered conflicts—struggles over recognition, political power, and land—in a context where the state is often perceived as either absent or partisan.

Historical Roots of Ethno-Nationalism

The political consciousness and ethnic identity formation among the tribal communities of Northeast India can be traced back to the colonial period. The introduction of new political-economic structures, missionary education, and recruitment into colonial military service exposed hill tribes to global developments and catalyzed their modern political awakening.

The Nagas were among the first to articulate political aspirations. The formation of the Naga Club in 1918 and its 1929 memorandum to the Simon Commission demanding independence after British withdrawal laid the ideological foundation. In 1947, the NNC under A.Z. Phizo declared Naga independence. The establishment of the Naga Federal Government and the Naga Federal Army on March 22, 1952, marked the shift from political assertion to armed insurgency, grounded in the Naga ideal of “village republics” and a rejection of Indian sovereignty.

The Meiteis of the Imphal Valley, in contrast, anchored their identity in a 2,500-year-old Vaishnavite civilizational tradition. Their insurgency stems from perceived betrayal and loss of sovereignty following Manipur’s “controversial merger” with India in 1949. Meitei intellectuals argue that Hjam Irabot’s Red Guards, established in 1948, constituted the first insurgent force in the region—preceding even the Naga movement.

The Kukis historically occupied a liminal position between Nagas and Meiteis. Their political ambitions gained traction in the 1980s amid escalating inter-ethnic conflict and growing demands for recognition of Kuki territorial rights. Kuki insurgent groups, initially formed as buffer militias, began asserting an independent claim to a homeland called “*Zale’n-Gam*,” towards late 1980s.

British Colonial Legacies and Religious Conversions

British colonial administration fundamentally reshaped Manipur’s social geography by instituting a dual administration system that separated the valley (dominated by Meiteis) from the hills (inhabited by Nagas and Kukis). Coupled with the preferential engagement of Christian missionaries, this led to widespread conversion of hill tribes to Christianity, while Meiteis—who followed Hindu Vaishnavism—were excluded from colonial welfare and education networks.

Missionary institutions, experiences from World Wars, and exposure to broader political ideologies catalyzed the transformation of the Naga worldview from a clan-based oral tradition to a politically conscious Christian society. This enabled the articulation of a unified Naga identity that transcended traditional tribal divisions. Conversely, Meiteis developed a sense of marginalization, rooted in exclusion from colonial patronage and the growing assertiveness of the Christian tribal communities in post-independence India.

AFSPA, Resistance, and the State’s Response

In response to escalating insurgency, the Indian government enacted the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in 1958, granting sweeping powers to the military in “disturbed areas.” The Act has faced sustained opposition from civil society groups, human rights organizations, and ethnic communities—particularly the Nagas and Meiteis—who cite rampant abuses, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances. Incidents like the Malom massacre (2000) and the

custodial death and rape of Thangjam Manorama (2004), both in Manipur, have galvanized protest and drawn global attention.

While insurgency has contributed to violence, and economic and political disruption, state's over dependence on militarized response has deepened public alienation. In conflict-affected areas, the absence of effective governance, basic infrastructure, and welfare delivery has allowed insurgent and traditional institutions—especially churches and civil society organizations (CSOs)—to become alternative power centers.

Naga Insurgency: Fragmentation and the Peace Process

The Naga insurgency, despite being the oldest and most influential in Northeast India, has suffered from persistent fragmentation. The Shillong Accord of 1975, signed between a section of the NNC and the Indian government, led to internal divisions and the formation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. Further splits followed, resulting in the creation of NSCN(IM) under Thuingaleng Muivah and NSCN(K) under S.S. Khaplang in 1988.

Under Muivah's leadership, the insurgency attracted support from educated Nagas and elements of the Naga diaspora. However, factionalism, corruption, and inter-group violence eroded its credibility. Despite these setbacks, NSCN(IM) remains a key interlocutor in ongoing peace negotiations with the Government of India. The earlier 16-Point Agreement led to the creation of Nagaland in 1963, but the central demand of *Greater Nagalim*—integrating all Naga-inhabited areas across Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh—remains highly contentious and is opposed by Meitei and Assamese political actors.

Meitei Insurgency: Rise, Decline, and Current Status

The Meitei insurgency emerged from deep-seated grievances over the perceived loss of sovereignty following Manipur's merger with the Indian Union in

1949. Major insurgent groups such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) operated from bases in Myanmar and Bangladesh, drawing support from sections of the diaspora and foreign intelligence agencies.

During the 1980s and 1990s, these groups established parallel governments, imposed taxes, and promoted a strong sense of Meitei nationalism. However, by the 2000s, their influence declined significantly due to internal factionalism, waning public support, and effective counterinsurgency operations. Increasing frustration over Kuki political assertiveness and perceived illegal immigration from Myanmar shifted Meitei insurgents' focus from anti-India resistance to inter-ethnic rivalry, especially with the Kukis.

Kuki Insurgency: Homeland Aspirations and Ethnic Assertiveness

The Kuki insurgency has its roots in a series of ethnic conflicts, beginning with the Kuki-Hmar clash in 1960 and followed by the brutal Naga-Kuki conflict during 1992–1997. These violent episodes led to large-scale displacement and the radicalization of Kuki youth. Insurgent groups such as the Kuki National Army (KNA) and the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) were formed to protect Kuki interests and gradually consolidated control over strategic areas like Kangpokpi and Churachandpur.

The formation of the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the articulation of the *Zale'n-Gam* vision—a proposed Kuki nation or Greater Kukiland—by its president, P.S. Haokip,² signaled a strategic shift toward broader ethnic

² *Zale'n-Gam* transliterates as “freedom of the people in their land.” Haokip propagated the ideology of *Zale'n-Gam* as a means to unify the Kukis' erstwhile ancestral domain predating British rule and to restore the Kuki nation under this banner. The concept encapsulates and articulates the essence of Kuki history, nationalism, and the aspiration to reclaim their pre-colonial territorial homeland. Bose, R. (2024, January 18). *Manipur, militancy and the search for 'homeland'*. *Outlook*. <https://www.outlookindia.com/national/manipur-militancy-and-the-search-for-homeland-news-298250>. Accessed on 24 July 2025.

consolidation across India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. To sustain their movement, Kuki insurgent groups resorted to drug trafficking, extortion, and tactical alliances with Meitei underground outfits. Since 2001, they have increasingly controlled key narcotics routes from Myanmar's Sagaing region into Manipur through the border town of Moreh.

While the Kukis portray their insurgency as defensive—aimed at protecting their communities from Meitei aggression—Meiteis contend that Kukis have misused the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements to stockpile arms, extort money, and alter the demographic balance through illegal immigration.

The Meitei-Kuki Conflict (2023–2024)

The Meitei-Kuki ethnic conflict that erupted in May 2023, triggered by the Manipur High Court's recommendation to consider granting Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to the Meiteis, marks an unprecedented escalation in ethnic violence in the state. What began as a legal issue quickly spiraled into arson, riots, and targeted killings, particularly in Churachandpur.

Meiteis see the ST demand as a legitimate effort to reclaim their historical land rights in the hills, while Kukis view it as a direct threat to their territorial security and autonomy. Beneath this conflict lie long-standing mutual grievances: Meiteis accuse Kukis of illegal migration,³ forest encroachment for poppy cultivation, and demographic manipulation. Conversely, Kukis allege systemic discrimination, land exploitation, and state-sponsored marginalization by Meitei-led governments.

The security situation deteriorated rapidly, exacerbated by alleged partisanship of the police and Assam Rifles and inflammatory rhetoric, including

³ A fresh memorandum issued by the Government of Manipur, dated 23 July 2025, highlights the severity of illegal migration resulting from ongoing disturbances in neighboring Myanmar. It directs District Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police to take appropriate action against illegal migration and migrants. A copy of the order is annexed as Annexure II at the end of this article.

reported genocidal threats by Meitei extremist leaders. The outcome has been mass displacement, hundreds of fatalities, economic paralysis, and a near-complete breakdown of inter-community trust.

Today, many Kukis refuse to travel through Imphal, while Meiteis are barred from tribal-dominated areas. Kuki leaders are demanding a separate administrative arrangement, while Meitei groups are determined to prevent any territorial division of the state. Myanmar's internal conflict and alleged support from groups like the People's Defense Force (PDF) to Indian Kukis have added a cross-border dimension to the conflict.

Ethnic Demography, Governance, and Political Implications

Manipur's demographic composition—Meiteis (53%), Nagas (24%), Kukis (18%)—has created a fragile polity, where ethnic identity often overrides civic politics. Civil society organizations closely aligned with underground groups wield disproportionate influence, often sidelining formal democratic institutions.

Kuki and Naga communities accuse the Meiteis of monopolizing administrative power, while Meiteis allege that tribal communities disproportionately benefit from ST reservations. The increasing politicization of identity has led to demands for mechanisms like the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Inner Line Permit (ILP) to counter perceived demographic threats.

Geopolitical Dimensions and Regional Instability

Northeast India has long served as a strategic frontier, and unrest in Manipur poses significant challenges to India's *Act East* policy. The porous Indo-Myanmar border has enabled Indian insurgent groups to operate transnationally, establishing camps with past support from China and ongoing connections in Bangladesh and Nepal. The return of political instability in Bangladesh after Sheikh Hasina's departure in 2024 has rekindled fears of renewed safe havens for Indian insurgents.

China's expanding influence in Myanmar and historic ties with groups like the NSCN and UNLF further complicate India's security calculus. Moreover, Kuki solidarity across national borders, through the vision of *Zalen'-Gam* adds another layer of geopolitical tension.

According to Basit (2018),⁴ India–Myanmar counter-militancy cooperation has historically been constrained by mutual distrust, ambivalence, and Myanmar's unwillingness or inability to act against India-hostile insurgents sheltered on its territory. However, since the 2010s, a convergence of strategic, political, and economic interests has led to unprecedented, though still limited, collaboration between the two countries. The core drivers of this cooperation include:

- India's strategic imperative to counter Chinese influence in its northeastern neighborhood through the *Act East* policy;
- Myanmar's need to diversify its foreign partners amidst international isolation over the Rohingya crisis;
- Mutual interest in stabilizing India's northeast, which remains a base of persistent ethno-nationalist insurgency;
- Security threats posed by transnational groups like NSCN-K, whose operations destabilize both countries;
- Myanmar's limited state capacity, evidenced by its tacit acceptance of Indian cross-border strikes and continued ceasefires with India-hostile militants.

Despite signs of cooperation—such as intelligence sharing, joint patrolling, and military exercises—critical tensions remain. Myanmar continues to harbor groups that carry out cross-border attacks on Indian forces, complicating efforts at

⁴ Basit, S. H. (2018). India-Myanmar relations and the management of transnational militant threats. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 11(2), 73–92.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26477720>

trust-building. India's deeper engagement is partly driven by fears of Chinese support to insurgents and a desire to project regional power through both economic and military means. Myanmar's ongoing fragmentation has significantly altered the dynamics of Indian insurgent groups, particularly benefiting Kuki underground factions. This shift has not only affected the Naga, Meitei, and Kuki insurgent groups in Manipur and Nagaland but has also enhanced the strength of Kuki insurgents in Manipur, posing a growing threat to both the Nagas and the Meiteis. The conflict has the potential to spill over into adjoining Assam and Mizoram, further destabilizing the internal security environment in this part of Northeast India.

The relationship remains embedded in a complex mix of conflict and cooperation, with both states navigating asymmetries of power, diverging priorities, and the enduring challenge of transnational militancy. Cooperation is increasing not because the insurgent threat has been resolved, but because regional geopolitics and strategic calculations have made such collaboration more necessary.

Manipur: Protracted Conflict and Fragile Peace

Manipur today represents what conflict scholars term an *accumulated protracted conflict*—a complex interplay of historical grievances, ethnic rivalries, weak state capacity, and external geopolitical influences that perpetuate cycles of violence. The ongoing Meitei-Kuki conflict exemplifies this dynamic, where ethnic nationalism intersects with institutional decay, partisan politics, and long-standing contestations over identity and territory.

China's strategic presence in Myanmar, along with its historic support to Indian insurgent groups (IIGs), continues to raise serious security concerns. Naga and Meitei insurgents had established contact with China as early as the 1950s and 1960s, receiving training and logistical aid. Myanmar has long served as a base for various IIGs, including the UNLF, PLA, and NSCN factions, with ethnic linkages facilitating cross-border operations. Bangladesh and Nepal have also been used intermittently for shelter, arms procurement, and fund transfers. Bangladesh, under

the Khaleda Zia regime, provided safe havens to ULFA, NDFB, and UNLF operatives until a crackdown was initiated by Sheikh Hasina. However, her departure in August 2024 has shifted Bangladesh's political orientation, creating conditions more favorable to Pakistan and leading to a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist activity, once again raising fears of insurgent sanctuaries.

The present Meitei-Kuki violence, which erupted in May 2023 following a Manipur High Court recommendation to consider granting Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to the Meiteis, stems from deeper structural issues. These include competitive ethnic politics, rising Kuki political aspirations, perceived neglect of government services, and the weakening of administrative neutrality due to corruption and partisanship. The conflict is further complicated by the failure of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement, which was intended to contain Kuki insurgent activity but instead allowed militant groups to regroup and rearm. Simultaneously, the Indian state has failed to neutralize Meitei insurgent bases in Myanmar, contributing to the continued cycle of violence and retaliation.

In a small state with a demographically segmented society—Meiteis (53%), Nagas (24%), Kukis (18%)—ethnic identity dominates governance, and civil society often acts as a proxy for insurgent groups. Here, the state is weak and frequently perceived as biased or absent, while ethnic consciousness remains strong. Each group advances its own vision of “nationhood,” often rooted in a combination of historical memory, territorial claims, and political insecurity. Significantly, tribal societies largely rely on oral history, which can be conveniently shaped, altered, or interpreted in multiple ways.

Drawing on Fearon and Laitin's (2003)⁵ framework, the Meitei-Kuki-Naga conflict reflects the characteristics of rural insurgency driven by state weakness. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min's (2010)⁶ argument—that ethnic exclusion from state

⁵ Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1), 75-90. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>

⁶ Cederman, L.-E., Wimmer, A., & Min, B. (2010). Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis. *World Politics*, 62(1), 87-119. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40646192>

power, rather than diversity itself, is a principal cause of civil war—resonates deeply in Manipur’s fractured political terrain.

The continuing conflict has left over 200 dead, thousands displaced, and hundreds living in refugee camps, unable to return to their homes. The law-and-order situation has deteriorated, with free movement between districts disrupted. The conflict has rekindled contentious debates around indigeneity, migration, and citizenship. Demands for implementing the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Inner Line Permit (ILP) have gained momentum, amid allegations that thousands of Kukis have settled illegally from across the Myanmar border.

Mutual distrust among communities has reached a tipping point. Meiteis and Nagas accuse the Assam Rifles of siding with Kuki insurgents, while Kuki leaders claim state institutions are biased against them. Meanwhile, Naga insurgent groups—though critical of central intervention—continue to engage in peace talks with the Indian government. In contrast, public support for Meitei insurgents has eroded, and these outfits have further fragmented. In the present context, their role is defined more by an anti-Kuki stance than by ideological resistance to the Indian state.

Despite this prolonged violence, the region has historically displayed a preference for negotiated settlements and political accommodation within the Indian constitutional framework. For many ethnic groups, demands for “sovereignty” often signify calls for greater autonomy rather than full secession. Since the creation of Nagaland, other groups have vied for similar concessions. However, growing ethnic militarization, eroding inter-community trust, and the weak governance present significant obstacles to peace.

The current state of the Meitei-Kuki conflict is one of tense and violent stalemate. Sporadic incidents continue on both sides, and fears of escalation persist—especially if Kuki solidarity consolidates across borders, including in adjoining areas of Mizoram, Assam, and Nagaland. The Kukis’ political aspirations, shaped since the Naga-Kuki war of the 1990s, now encompass the demand for *Zale’n-Gam*, adding a transnational dimension to an already volatile situation.

This evolving conflict has serious implications for India's *Act East* policy and regional stability. Without a credible, inclusive peacebuilding initiative that acknowledges the historical grievances and contemporary aspirations of all communities, Northeast India is likely to remain trapped in a cycle of tenuous calm and episodic violence.

Conclusion

The enduring insurgencies in Northeast India are symptomatic of a deeper and unresolved crisis of national integration rooted in colonial legacies, fragmented ethnic identities, and contested state legitimacy. While movements like those of the Nagas and Meiteis emerged from claims to historical sovereignty, others, such as the Kuki insurgency, are driven by territorial insecurity and ethnic self-assertion. The Indian state's response—alternating between accommodation and coercion—has produced uneven outcomes. External linkages, porous borders, and shifting geopolitical dynamics—especially the role of China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh—have added complexity to internal conflicts.

The recent Meitei-Kuki conflict underscores the structural fragility of Manipur's polity, where ethnic identity overrides civic governance, and institutional decay fuels mistrust. Although insurgent violence has declined in intensity over time, its transformation into decentralized, militarized ethnic politics continues to challenge democratic institutions and peacebuilding efforts. The failure of administrative neutrality, persistent demands for separate homelands, and competing visions of nationhood signal a fragile and combustible political order.

Sustainable peace in the region will require more than security measures; it demands a credible, inclusive political roadmap that addresses historical grievances, ensures equitable governance, and strengthens inter-community trust. Without such efforts, Northeast India risks remaining a theatre of episodic violence and strategic vulnerability.

List of Northeast insurgent groups

Nagaland

Naga insurgent groups

1. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah)
2. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (K-Khango)
3. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Reformation)
4. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (K-Nikki)
5. NNPG (7 groups)
6. Akato Group
7. Isak Sumi Group
8. Kughalu-Amgmai Group

Manipur

Meitei insurgent groups

1. United National Liberation Front/ Manipur Liberation Army
2. Revolutionary Peoples' Front/ Peoples' Liberation Army
3. Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup (KYKL)
4. People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
5. Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)
6. Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF)

Naga insurgent groups

1. Manipur Naga Revolutionary Front
2. Zelinagrang United Front

(In red, the outfits have been declared outlawed by GoI notification.)

Kuki insurgent groups

Under KNO/KNA umbrella group (17)

1. Kuki National Army (KNA)
2. Hmar National Army (HNA)
3. Kuki National Front- Military Council (KNF/MC)
4. KNF (TS)
5. KNF (Z)
6. Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)
7. KRA (U)
8. Kuki National Liberation Front (KNLF)
9. Kuki Liberation Army/ Timothy (KLA/Timothy)
10. Kuki Liberation Army (KLA/Thunder)
11. United Minorities Liberation Army (UMLA)
12. United Tribal's Liberation Army (UTLA)
13. People's Republican Army (PRA)
14. United Socialist Revolutionary Army (USRA)
15. Zou Defence Volunteers (ZDV)

Under United People's Front (UPF) umbrella group (8)

1. Kuki National Front- President (KNF/P)
2. Kuki Revolutionary Army – Unification (KRA/U)
3. United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF)
4. Kuki Revolutionary Front (KRF)
5. Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)
6. Zomi Revolutionary Front (ZRF)
7. Zou Defence Volunteers (ZDV-UPF)

8. Hmar Peoples' Conference – Democratic (HPC/D)

Assam

1. United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-Independent)
2. UNLF (Pro)
3. NDFB (NDFB/RD; NDFB/S; NDFB/ P)
4. National Liberation Front of Bodoland (NLFB)
5. Kamatapur Liberation Organizatino (KLO)
6. KLO/ Kamatapur Nation
7. Kabri Longchari North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF)- six groups (KNLF, UPLA, PDCK and 3 factions of KPLT)
8. Karbi People's Liberation Army (KPLA)
9. 5 Adivasi outfits (AANLA, BCR, STF, APA, ACMA) and 3 splinter groups
10. National Santhal Liberation Army/ Anti Talk
11. Dimasa National Liberation Army (DNLA)
12. Kuki groups of Assam (KRA, UKDA, KLO/KLA, UPRF & KNLA)
13. Presence of Maoist and Islamist elements

Mizoram

1. MNF : a political party after 1986
2. Hmar National Army (HNA)
3. Inactive IIGs (6)

Tripura

4. All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)- defunct
5. National Liberation Front of Twipra (NLFT)/ BM
6. 25 defunct IIGs

Meghalaya

7. Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA)- defunct after 2018
8. Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) – active from BD
9. Achik National Liberation Army (ANLA) - defunct
10. Achik Songa An'pachkgipa Kotok (ASAK) - defunct
11. Achik National Liberation Cooperative Army (ANLCA) - defunct
12. Achik Tiger Force (ATF) - defunct
13. Achik National United Force (ANUF) - defunct
14. Liberation of Achik Elite Force (LAEF) - defunct


GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR
SECRETARIAT: HOME DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM

Imphal, the 23rd July, 2025

No. H-802/19/2021-HD-HD: In view of apprehension of influx of illegal migrants into the State especially due to the turmoil situation in neighbouring Countries, the following advisories are hereby issued for strict compliance:

- i. All Deputy Commissioners and Superintendent of Police shall keep robust mechanism to prevent anyone from crossing into State Boundaries illegally and shall ensure to maintain utmost vigil at international, inter-State and inter-district boundaries so as to prevent any such movement.
- ii. Any such movement, if detected, should be immediately reported and biographic and biometric details of such persons be captured mandatorily.
- iii. Such illegal migrants shall have to be kept in put at secured designated locations for providing shelter and humanitarian support without allowing them to get mixed up or naturalised with Local Populace.
- iv. All such illegal migrants shall be deported after following due procedures.
- v. All Deputy Commissioners shall constitute District level Committee with members from District Police to conduct checking at all suspected locations and shall conduct regular review of the same.
- vi. Deputy Commissioners shall regularly monitor the Exit-Entry Points under Border Pass System. Tracing of defaulters/ overstayed cases shall be done through District Police.
- vii. District level Task Force for checking of illegal migrants with the following composition shall have to be made operational at the earliest:
 - a. Additional Superintendent of Police of the District – leader.
 - b. Officer representing office of DC not below the rank of SDC.
 - c. Representative of Assam Rifles/ BSF/CRPF as desired by team leader.
 - d. Biometric staffs.


23 July 2025
(N. Ashok Kumar)

Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Home),
Government of Manipur

Copy to:

1. Secretary to Governor of Manipur.
2. Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur.
3. Director General of Police, Manipur
4. All DCs of districts
5. All SsP of districts